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"The judicial Power of th~ United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court ••• " (Article III, S:sction 1,
clause..-:1 I) •
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States ••• " (Article III, section 2, clause 1).
"The Congress shall have EQif.e r: q . To regulate C·o111~
merce with foreign Nations, and 'among .. the several States,
and with t~e Indian Tribes; ••• " (Article· 1, section 8,
clause 3).
From these three clauses of t he United States Con.s ti tution, the Supreme Court derived ·the authority_ necessary
to make it the arbiter of United States economic affairs.
Under the Articles of

Conf,detation, ~ Cong ress

did not

have the power to regulate int e rstate and foreign commerce.
As a

r~sult,

each state attempted to protect local business

at the expense of the other states through t h e enforcing of
trade barriers.

Removal of these restrictions on commercial

relations imposed by the "sovereign" states became one of the
"moving purposes'' which brought about the Constitutional
Convention in 1787.

Ther e seems to be no doubt that the com-

merce clause was inserted in the Constitution to prevent the
states fro m interferi ng with the fre edom of commercial intercourse.
The constitutiona l meaning of the . commerce clause has
been developed and expanded by statutory enactments and
through judicial interpretation.

These have converted this

clause into one - of the most important grants of authority in
the Constitution.

Justice Harlan Stone once said that the

2.

"commerce clause and the wise interpretation of it, perhapa
more tha.n any other contributing element, have united to bind
the several states into a nation."

It is largely through

the commerce power that Congress has gained the authority to
regulate almost every conceivable aspect of American lite.
And the commerce powe.r continues to expand to immense proportions.
The commerce clause has a two-fold effect.

(1) It is

the greatest source of power ex-ercised by the federal governmerit in times of peace.

(2) It is the most important limita-

tion on the powers of the states, with the exception of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Therefore, as Justice William Douglas

noted,- the commerce clause "has a negative as · well as
positive aspect.
author;j.ty.

It not only serves to augment federal

By .its own force it also. cuts down the power of
.

·a

.a

con~titutent
- .

.

sta.t.e in its exercise .of what normally would

~· ;

be part : of its residu.ai police power.

Both the positive and

negatiVe tii.S:pectS Of the QO:qlmerce ClaUSe haVe graV~ importance.H 2

.:, ..l·

"But the Constitution Q.o.es not define ··specific
spheres ·,af state and national authority over -interstate commerce •. Thus, by defa.:(ll.lt, the Supreme Court
. 1;~ ; ~ ven the power to decide finally what the states
Jind.;-·the·':"'t:.e dera.l government may or may not d.o with
respect to interstate commerce. In thi-s. process the
. Court again becomes the referee between the cl~ims
of national ·a nd. local authorities. n3
.
The foremost question concerning the commerce clause has

been what · was the clause originally intended to mean and has
the Court deviated from this original meaning?

At different

periods in history, different Courts have given d:H'ferent
meanings to this clause.

There havebeen · cuu.rts which wlshfd

~.

to .s upport emly the

neg atlv~·

·a spects of the rc lause, .a nd

Courts whlch supp'o rt the power beine; used for positive
tional regulation.

na~

There is no way of knowing which inter-

pr:~etation was actually held

by the . :framers of the eonsti tu'ti·on. 4

The first case to r ,e ach the Supreme Court ·w hich involved
a con:s truction of tJ:;:t:a:s clause was. the tamous. "Steamboat Oase, •t
C3:ibbons Y.!,. Ogden,." 9, U.'S. ·1, 1824.

This first case invculve.d
the negatiive rather than the positive imp~ica~ion--s of the
'c ommerce .clause,.

This liti gation gr.ew out o.f' the conflict

between a monopolJ which the ,S tate of New York had conferred
upon certain persons to. navigate, ts te·ai!looa,ts :upon the water.s
of that State and an act of Congress regulating the coastwA,. ae
trade.

The case raised directly the s 'c ope of Congress 1J?

power· over inter.s tate commerce .•
Chancellor Kent of New York, in upholding the ·~onopoly
granted by the s,ta.te against the claim of Gibbons_,

oper~a.tihg

under the authorit;Y of the f:ederal licensing act, maintained
that Congress did no.t have any direct jUJi'isdict:r.on over i.nte-rna:l commerce o.r waters.,

Daniel W'ebster., arguing· for Gibbons

on appeal t.b the Supreme Court, asserted that the power' of
Congress to: regulate commerce was
'

.

e~clus.i ve.

CQunsel for

the monopoly as·sert.ed that the power to regulate comm:er.c e, was
concurrent.

Webste~'s

definition of commerce as

comprehend~ng

"almost gtll tne 'Qu·s iness aon d intercourse ·o f li:fe IJ was·

e~unter.>.ed

by the defihi t:l._on of commer9e as "the transp'ortation and sa.H ;·
of

commodities~"'

'Both men agreed that in case Of a collision

of state and national power, the latter must

~revail,

but

Kent held that State power gave way only to the extent needed

4.
to give effect to the federal law.

Therefore, navigation on

state waters remained under state control.5
Chief Just:1;ce John Marshall chb:ae to examine the ': nature ·:_, .·
of national commerce power before finding the existence of
a conflict.

He rejected the r estrictive definition of commerce

as put· forth by the counsel for Ogden in the following words :
"Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is
something more; it is intercourse ••••
It ~ has, we believe, been universally admitted,
that these words comprehend every species of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations ••••
If this be the admitted meaning of the word in its
application to foreign nations it must carry .t he same
meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit,
unless there be some plain intelligible cause which
alters 1t. 11 b
-

The opinion then proceeds:
''The subject to which the power is next applied
is to commerce 'among the several states.' The word
'among' means intermingled with . A thing which is
among others · is intermingled with them. Commerce
among the States cannot stop at the external boundary
line of ea~h State, but may be introduced into the
interior. "'f
"Among " me a nt that commerce which concerns more states
than one.
'

Though the states retain authority to enact, inspect,

pilotage, and

he~lth

laws, even here Congress could enter

the field if it chose.
What, hhowever , is Congress's power to regulate commerce?
Marshall answers,
-II

It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed . This
power, like all others vested in Congress is - compl.e.te
in its elf, may be exercised to its-.·utmost e.Xten:t., :--arid
acknowledge no limi tations, other than are prescribed
in the Constitution ••• the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, is
vested in Congress as absolutely as it· would . be in a

5.
single government, having in its constitution the
.
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as
are found in the Constitution of the United States." 8
In the case of Gibbons .Y..t. Oe;den, .Mr, Chief Justi ·c e
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
"The appellant contends that this decree is .erroneous,
because the laws which purport to give the exclusive ~. ~- ·
privilege it sustains are repugnant -to - the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
They are said to be repugnant--(1) To that clause
in the Constitution which authorizes Congress to
regulate comme~ce. (2) To . that which authorizes Congress to P.~omote the progress of science and useful
arts... •
·
Marshall's opinion has been called the "emancipation
proclamation of American commerce. 11

But the Supreme Court

did not answer the question as to whether or not the states
had concurrent power over interstate commerce.

The con-

curring qpinion of Justi.ce William Johnson maintained that
Congress had· exclusive power over interstate commerce.
Although Marshall was inclined to agree with Johnson's view,
he was unwilling to hold specifically that the federal power
over comm$rce was exclusive.lO
In the absence of a coherently expressed doctrine,

th~

Court continued to be plagued with problems involving the
validity of state laws affecting forei gn or interstate commerce.
The cases decided during much of the Taney era did not clarify
the state of the law.

Instead, the Court vacillated in a

confused and muddled way on the extent to whicht. th.e::~'eommerce
clause limited regulations of interstate commerce by
state legislatures.

tb~

Finally, in the classic cas$. of Cooley

Board of Wa.rdeps, the Supreme Court fashioned a new formula

~

6.

which combined both the exclusive and con·c -urrent doctrines.
In short, the Court held that the commerce power is exclusive
with respeot to · some
to others.

The

matte~s

princip~e

and concu.rrertt with respect

of' the Cooley case 1 s .s till :im-

portant, but since there are so many pos.s ible regulations of
commerce, ·i t is extremely difficult to apply.

The r- gpi:rrion

in the Cool~y case does not ·c onstitute a precise·,. aut.omatic
rule f :or de.cidlng cases, but. it did turn the atte:n.tion. of the
court awa,y from an ana-lysis ·o f the commerce power to the _ subject . upon which the power is ·o perated.

However, in .e a·ch: cm.se

the Court must now f .a ce · the difficult question as to whet:P,er·
a. particular_ subject of crommerc.i al regulation requires uniform and national .c ontrol or whether it is so local in character that a: state may re,g ulate it •11·
The decisions of the .S upre:me Gou.rt have made it clear
that the 1'ptrrpose of the commerce clause was not to .preclude
all state reguiation of commerce crossing state lines. but
to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers: or
obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate. or foreign ." 12
If the• subject matter allowed regulation by stat·e or loqal
government, two que.s tions .still remained:

Did the state law

discriminate against inters.tate commerce, in favor oi' l ;o cal
crommerce?

Did the state act, altho,ugh nondiscriminatory,

place an unreas.onable burden on interstate commerce?

The

attemP,ts to answer th.ese are inevitable colored by ·a host ot
socio-e.conomfc, fact and theo,r y, favo-r ed by ,judicial biras.
Theories of federalism marched hand in hand with economic theory.

'

..

7.
Actually, the state:e passed very l'i ttl:e legislation
designed. pri-n cipal'l y for the purpose of regulatlng interstate
commerce o FJ:owever, mueih state legislation concern_ing· local
matters~

ha,ppens to deal with persons or transac.tions in Xnter-

sta.te commerce, and many of these acts have been .c hallenged.
on the -ground that they p:l ac•

unconstitut~onal

burdens on

interstate commer,ceo
The state sometimes uses it.s npolice· power" (the power
to protect. the public health, se,:f'ety, -morale, and general
welfare) to burden lnterstate commerce.

Thus t a sta.t_e police

-r egulation is v:a.lid only .if i,t .does not conflict wi.th a law
of Congress and if it. does not ili1J)Ose . an unreasonable burden
or interstate ·c ommerce. 1 3
The power of the states to t -ax ;Sometimes have a grea·t
impac.t . on commerce.
"In imposing taxes ;for state purposes a. stGLte is not
·
exercising any power- which the Constitu,tion ·na.s confer.r ed
upon Congre.s s. It iS only when th~ ta~- .aperates to
reeulate commer.c e between tne sta't$S. ~t'-. w:l th fote1gn
nations to an- extent which infringes. the authority
confe:rred_upon Congress, that the te~.x ·c an be said to
exeeed constitutional 1im1 ta ti.On$. Form"s ~or state
taxat.1 on whose tendency i"s to probi'bit the comme,rce
or place i.t at a .di stadva.ntage as compa"r ed with ·or ":tn
competitlon, with int·raatate comm,e rce, .a nd any state
tax which di ~criminate't against. the commerce, are
familiar examples of the exercise ·of' state taxing
power in an unc.onsti.t utional manner, because· of 1 ts
-obvious regulatory effact upon commerce . between the
states o.• • • Not .all. state taxation is to be condenm"<l because-, in some manner,. it has an eff.ect upon
comme:t'c$ between: the .s tates, and- the·r e aFe· many forms
of tax whose hurd ens, when 'di -s tr;t buted, ·thr-ough the
play of economic forces, aff:e ct interstate commerce
whl,ch, nevertheless., fall short of the regulatia>n:
of the comm4rce which the· Oonsti tution leaves to
Cong:res$. r•J.
It is not pos·sible to .f ormu;Late a d,efj,nite rul·e by which
the Congr.e ss may de-t ermine whetn.e r the state police, .o r

. 8.

t.axi:pg powers· ha.ve been ·e xer:c i sed. 1!1. ·such ~a :way as to burden
interstate commerce.

Each ga:se must . :tie decided by viewing .

its own particular· f'acts .•

Neverthel·e ss, with the steady

growth of ;interstate ,comm.erce ,. partJcula:rly since 1.:8 90, the
com~rc· e

clause has been used with lnbr.e asing frequency ·t o.

· ~~~·"J.i.date s.ta:te regl.llatory · and ta~c mea.En.tr~s. 1 5
Aft·e r 1890 two ·damlna;p:t themes b(l!lgan ·to pervade the
app'l ication of the comme;rc<5e clQ.use:

use of the commerce, pow('!;r

by Congr.e ss to accomplish· bl;'o.a d s:oci:al and economic purposes;
continuation and furth.e!'l . develo,p ment a£ ~ the commerce clause
as a: rest~t·cttt.ibn.

on

st~tte srction affecting .,interstate commerce .•.

Despite Marshall's broad intel"'pretation o.f the :fed.e ral govern:ment '· s commerce powers:,, the de.v e,l opment of the coiJlmerce

clause .as, a. grant of
substantial.
century.

11

posi ti ve'' J>owet>s to 'Congress. had

d:evelopnren~'

n~

until the begi-nning .of the twentieth

Before this the;r>.e

w~;s

''little

.oct:a~.si>O:n

:for tne

·a ff-i rmative exerc.is.e of the. commerce power-, and ·"t he influence
of ·the oTa:u.se

~n

American 1i:t'e and law was. a,

But .as the nation grew

n~gati .ve

one.

and the industri.al society .emerged,

more ~a.nd mo:re Htc~l commer.c la.l matters required a ·uni:foJ>m
sys~t~m of national legislat'i on. 16
Perhaps nowhere is .t he change frf>m ·l ocal to ma.tional
.r-e gul~tion

:t>oad.s.

better demonstrated than in. the case of the ·ra.11-

In 1877 the grQ1.:l.p of Grange:r cae,e s came bef.or.e the

Supre.me· Court.

The. daurt held that. the states · coU:l·d fix

minimum ana maxi.nrum r;a;tes for'
of ·congressiotial legislation.

p,a.il:r~~ds

and .o ther 1n :a bs.e nce

Eut only ntne years .later j:n

t 'he ca.se of .Wabash, St_,: Louis g:nd :PacifiC: Rad. lroad Oo. L

9.

lllinois, 118
Granger cases.

u.s. 557,

1886, repudiated its views in the

The Illinois act under con,s idera.tion in the

Wabash ca.se had 'b een applied as a corrective of long- and
short-haul rate discriminations on .shipments from Illinois to
New York City.

Th$ Court held that th• IllinQis statute,

which imposed a penalty for lower rates on long hauls which
extended beyond the borders of the state, was in conflict
with the commerce 'Clause even though Congress had not legislated
in this field.
But if the states could not legislate and Congress had
not done so, how were railroad rates to be controlled?
answer came a few_months later

whe~

The

Congress created the

Interstate Commerce .Commission to fi.ll the gap.

The enactment

of the Interstate Commerce Act ' of 1887 was the first example
of the commerce clause exerting a posl ti ve influence in ·
American life and law.

When the .. Sherman Anti-Trust Act was

enacted in . l890, it manifested Congress' determination to use
its power over interstate commerce for purposes far beyond
anything hitherto attempted.

These statutes brought with

them a new phase of adjudication which required the Court to
approach the interpretation of the commerce clause in the
light of an actual ·exere'l:se of Congress of its powers under
the· clause. 17
Difficult questions arose at
the ~ app;J.icabiiity ::...Qf

&nd commerce.

t~e

very begi nning concerning

the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to industry

The · rationale of the Act was the contract·s ,

combinations, and conspiracies, in the form o·f a trust or
otherwise, which restrain, or attempt to monopolize interstate

10.

trad~,

···t.tould be prohibited.

However, when the Court first

dealt with the Sherman Act, in

United~~~~~

Knight

Co., 156 U.S. 1, 1895, it gave little scope to the powers of
Congress.

The · Court, in the Knight case, held that the

Sherman Act could not be applied to a. virtual monopoly of the
sugar industry because the
interstate commerce.

To

ma:mJ.f~ct1:1re

of sugar was not in

Chief Justi·ce Fuller the only aspect

of commerce subject to federal regulation was transportation.
To achieve this limitation of national power the Court redefined :':'commerce" so as. to practically restrict it to what
Marshall considered its narrowest signification- 11 transportation.u
Fuller reasoned:
. :_

.11 Th·e~e must pe .:. a ·.~ poi'nt . :. or

-t 1-me when-( a..r ti·clss

~~ -~

·

cease to be· governed exclus1vely by ·domestic law and
begin to be governed and protected by. the nationa.~
.l!fW -of commercial regulation, and that moment •••Loc.curs
j!hen7 they eommence their final movement from the state
of thei~ origin to that of thei~ final destination."
In support of this limitation Of Marshall' ·S broad concept of commerce, Chief Justice Fuller invented one of the
most endurin~ formulas in tJ:ie. Court's arsenal of power crippling
devices-that of direct and indirect

effect~.

Said Fuller:

''Doubtless the power to control the manufacture
of a given thing involves in a certain sense the ~ ~ ·
control of 1 ts .dispo.si tion, but this ia a secondary ~.
and not the primary sense; and although the exercise
of that p·ower may result in bringing the operation
of commerce into play,. it does not control it, and·
affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

.!.

In this landmark case .t he Court was not enforcing the
Constitution, n·o r Chief Marshall's version of it.

Rather it

applied a · the:ory of the Union, and enthroned an economic
dogma-laissez-faire.

During the same term the Court delivered

11.

two other extremely conservative opinions18 which brought
storms of

pro,t~sts

from large. s-egments. .of the American people

who were now convinced that the judifil.:cay· had become the
reacti·o nary defender of e:p.tre'nched ~conomic interestELa 1 9
However, even while important 6pin1ons- in this line of
restrictive authority were being_ written, ·other cases ·c alled

.

forth broader interpretations of the commerce clause aes1

tined to ·supersede the earlier one.s, and to brin~ about a
.r eturn to the principles of Chief Justice M_arshall in Gibbons
.Y..!; >Ogden,

In Swift~ Co 1 . .Y..::. Unit·ed States, 196

u.s. 375,

1905, the Court held that a combination of meat pac_kers was
an. illegal monopoly under' the Sherman Act on the ground that
their activities were transactions in interstate commerce.
For Chief Justice Fu].ler ·' s v.iew of commerce as manuf·a .cture,
traffic., and transportation, Justice Holmes substituted t}J.e
realistic -'View of commerce as a

11

current."

The buying and

selling of cattle. 'Was actually part "of a single plan··;~t
Speaking·.- f'oi' the unanimou·s Court, Justice Holmes stated that
"~ommerce among the stat~s is notr a technicai l ·e gal

conception, but a pr·ac·t ical one, drawn from th_e _c ours.e
of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a
place in one .state, ' ·with the expectation that they
will. end their transit, after purchase , in another _,
ana whe11- in eff'e ct they do so, ~i th only the inter~ ...
rJ,llp,tt.btr neces·sary to find a purchase. a.t the stock- · .
yards, · and when this. is a typica.l , constantly recurring
course, the current thus existing is a ·c urr-ent. of
commerce among the states, and the purchase of the
cattle ia a part and incident of such commerce,.''
Of ·§wift v. United States, Chief Justice Taft said in
1922 (Board of · T;ade _of Ch.tca:fft!· v. Olsen,, 262

u.s.

1):

"That cas.e was a milestone in the interpretation of the c.ommerce qla;use of the C-e:msti tution.
It recognized· the great .c hanges and development in
the business of this vast country and drew again
.

-·"'

.

~

.·

.;

12.

the dividinp; line between interstate and intrastate commerce where the Constitution intended it
to be. !t refused to permit local incidents of
great interstate movement, which, taken alone, were
intr.a state, to characterize the movement as such.
The· Swift case merely fitted the commerce clause
to the re~l and practical essense of modern business
growth.-11 c
In a series of

~ases

during this same period, the Court

began to sustain -the use of the commerce
the exercise of federal

poli~e

powers.

c~ause

as a basis for

They clearly estab-

lis'J;led the principle that :the commerce power could be used
to accomplish purely social objectives.

In the

case

le:~ding

of Champ1£n .Yo.!. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 1'903, a federal act
prohibiting the interstate shi,p ment of lottery ti .c kets was
upheld.

The Court· reasoned that the fac.ilities of interstate

commerce were used to promot·e and spread the evi'l ; so. if a
state under its police· power could suppress lotteries within
1 ts limits, the ·C ongress, invested with the power to regulate
interstate commerce, could provide that such commerce

11

shall

not be polluted .by the carrying of lottery tickets from one
state tro ·. another. tt

Congress was the only autho:ri ty e.apable

of stopping that and similiar social evile.

Shortly after

the decision in the Lottery ·c ase, Congress proceeded to
enact a number of statutes which barred objectionable articles
!'rom interstate commerce or which

forbad~

the use of inter-

state commerce facilities for immoral or criminal activities.
After

~918

the Supreme Court's.restrictive interpretation

of the commerce clause

u.s.

251, 1918.

reappe~r.s

in Hamme1r .!..£. Dagenhart ., 247 ·

The Court, following the seriously qualified

Sugar Trust precedent, again ,d:rew a. distinction between

•. ,~

21

•

&

--

commerce a.nd llllil,YXl.tfac·t urinGh

Cong:r.esa had prohibit,ea trans-

porta.ti.o n in interstate ,c o·mmeJ?ce· of ;products· ·produc.~d

t>~

.c hild 'l&I.oor (age ·H5 in mine a ,. a.g e .1 4 :tn facto~ies, or mo·r e
that 48 n.our wee_k ·ro:r t:tle ~rg~ gr.ou_l.J l4-.l 6 y.e are).

Ju~stic• Day

· ch_&~act'el"iz~d. the: precedents~ invcH v1ng .l ·o tteries, :focd, and

w'I-Ti,t e s.J:.,a very· a,s1 a;ttempte to·

re gulat~ - wherr~e

tra.n~portatJ: on

was used to ae~ompi::L£h harmful r~sults; production :and 'i :ts

incHl..ents were local mat-ters 'bey.o nd the. reach o.f

Congress~

Ret'l,lrn.ing 'to Chief Justi .c e. Fullev' s na:r\rGrw. V;i.$W Qf
comm~rce: ·1

Just.i ce Day r.easonea.:·

aver,. -i~1'lterstate transportat-ion, or ·i .t s in·c;J.dent :§ '
the re-gulatory power 9r Co;ng;ress1 j. s ample~ but the
··
p:rod:o:ctlon. ol' s..:rtie·l 'e1il, intended :f·Or inters tat~ ·
co:mrqe:rc~ ,. j~ ~- a matter of lac.al ·r egulat.:ton • 1'
11

Day bolst,~rea. · h_i :s ne,a_~oning by ·r~c.ours~ to ~ ·theory gf
""

f•derS(lf sm.

~

Ere wt>¢'>te :,

11

'lt must never be f 'or,got ten t:h@.t the na:bi.-G:n is
made up 'O;f stat·E3.s to whic.h ar~ _:_ rwtrust~d ·t h:e powe!;\s.
of lot~a.l gov.e!':nmertt,. and to th$m the, ,!}Ower .a ·not
ex,pressll;y .ZS· is.7deditg~~ed to the :nat1·a na1 .g overn, m~nt. are1 reservea.
,, ·
.
"'
·

~

In. a

d1~$·enting,

~hat. powe-r·:s

-

-·"

opl:nion,

Jus.t;i.q~ Holro~s

:pointed. out

rgrant.e d :ar·e . not reserved.• · Jus.t ice Holfiles sai-d .:

;·~ ~ - .._, ~11H1~~tqu~.~ti~m-,. ~ then~; ~'- i; s ., nar~~d t© ,·whether the
:e xerc:ise o~ its Qtherwi~e: con~tl,tui1onal power b;w
Congress' can ib.e pr.onounoe.t \ ·unc.onst1.;t.uM._onal be:oause '
·o.f 1ta poss.ibl~ r .eacti§.>n upQn the ¢onduqt of ·t ne ,s tate$>
i .n a: matter Upon which...l have admi.tt,ed that tJ;l.~Y
a:re free from direct cont·r ol. l should. have thought 't hat
that matte:r 'h ad b.een dls:pas·ed o.f so ful l y a s to l 'ea:ve
no room. ;f'o;r> idou.?Qt ,. I !Should ha:ve: thought, that the
rno:s t oonspic.u.ou·s a.~c!s1ons of thj;s court ·· ha_d made !t
:cleat• that . the~ J;~ower to- re gulit~ commerce · a.n d Qther
consti tu~t.iona'l p·owers. could not be: ·c ut do';'fn or gua.li:f'i.ed
1:Jy ·the. fact that i:_t , might J.:nterf.ere ·w ith the carrying
out .of th,e domestic. po·l ic.y Qf any state.

; •• lt · ·d.oes' ·not mat.ter whetheF the s:uppo"B e9. evf:L.
prece·a:es or· .foJ.laws. tihe - transpcbrtat.ion • . It l.a -~nougl:l
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that, in the opinion of Congress, the transportation
encourages the evil .•••
The act doei not meddle with anything belonging
to the states, They may regulate their internal affairs
and their domestic commerce as they like. But when
they seek to send their products ac~oss the state line
they are no longer within their rights. If there were
no Constitution and no Congress their ·power to cross
the line would depend upon their neighbors. ·Under the
Constitution such commerce belongs not to the states 1
but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its
views of public· policy whatever indirect effect they
may have upon the activities of the stati$. Instead
of being endoUntered by a prohibitive tariff at he~
boundaries, the state encounters the public policy
of the United States, which it ~s for Congress to
express. The public policy of the United States is
shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a
wh o 1 e... • 112.)
The classio dissent by Justice Holmes in Rammer

1..:.

Dagenhart was used twenty-five years later by , Justice Stone
to overrule the majority opinion in United States .Y..:.. Darby,

312 U;S. 100, 1941.

Be wrote:

''In the more . than .ta "C emtury -1-1hich has .eJ.Jap.s.ed
since the decision 6-fbbons ··.Y.:i Ggden-, . · thes.e ~ pri'neiples
of _ c~nstitutional interpretation have ~een so long
and repeatedly recognized by this Court as applicable
to the Commerce Clause, that there would be little
occasion for repeating them now were it not for the
decision of -this Court twenty-two years ago in Hammer
L Da~nhart •.•• In that case it was held by a bare
majority of the Court, Over the powerful and now
classic dissent of Mr.Justice Holmes setting forth
the fundamental issues involved, that - Congress was
without power to exclude the products of child labo~
from interstate commerce. The reasoning and. conclusion
of the _Court's opinion there cannot. e reconciled with
the 1:lb.ncJ:usion :which we have reache . that the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to
exclude any article from interstate commerce subject
only to the specific prohibition ~f the Constitution.
Rammer L Dagenhart has not been followed.
The distinction on which the decision was rested
that Congressional power to prohibit interstate
commerce is limited to articles which in themselves
have some harmful or deleterious property-a distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by
any provision of the Oonstitution--has long been
abandoned ••••
11

.

The .c.on.clu.sion iB inescapable that Hammer v.
Dagenhart was a ·departur..e from the princ·i ples whlch
have prevailed in th~ interpretation of the Commerce
Clause both be.f ·o re and since the decision and that
such vitality, . as a precedent, as it then had. has
long since b~en exhau.s ted. It should be and how is
over;r:tU'led. "24
. .
Thus, when the Court was confronted with the constitu:ti>on:aJ~ 1:tY

clause,

.:o.t

t~o

the New Deal legi.slation under t.he commerce

lines of precedent were available.

The Court

could take a narrow view of the co.mmer9e clause as done in
United States Y..:.
-

L ct.

,.co. !!±.4
'. in.

Knight

Ha.mll!e~

Y..:. Dagppha:rt.

Or the Court. could take a broad view of the commerce power
as in Gibbons

V,:..

Ogden, .S wift and Go . ]J_ United State·s, and

United States Y..:. Da.rby,2.5
During the
b~tween

..

1930~-:s

the Supreme Court. was sharply divided

the conservatl ve and liberal justices.

_]?resident

Roosevelt began working out.. the terms of his New Deal legialatton,
Congress · ~

and as his. legislation was enacted by
began to vocus on the

Suprem~

Court.

attent.iOn

It would be here ·t hat.

the life or death d:.ecisions for the New Deal would be made.
·I n 1·936 the Supreme Court had all but wrecked the N'ew
Deal~

~

In the proce-ss of in-validating

number of N'ew

proposal.s ,- ~ the Court majority opposeg vigorously
si.on of the federal, commerce· power.

any

Dea~

expan-

.The Court seemed deter-

mined, in the case Schechter Poultry Corp. Y..:.. United States,
'

i

- 1

to maintain the distinction betwee.n -commerce and l11E;nuf;ac,turine;
as enunciate-d in the Sugar Trust case and Hammer Y...!.. Dagenhart.
After Roosevelt's overwhelming victory in l936, he was
determined to find a way to make t 'h e Supreme Court favor.a ble
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to his legislation.

He wa-s not sure that the .c ourt wottld

give ground even in view of his vote of confidence obtained
.in the .election, therefore,

Roosev~lt

went to Congress earlY'

in 1937 proposing a drastic sha.keup in the judiciary.

This

was Roosevelt's court-packing threat ·; and 1 t ran into; terrific
publi(} opposition.

.over.nlght

Buprem~

Court Justices were again

pictured as demigods far above the sw.e aty crowd, weighing public
•,

poli.cy on the de·licate scales of the law.

".Qonsti tut1onal1 ty:tt

was talked about as if it ' were a tangible fact, undeviating
and

precise~

not merely the current judiciary theory of

what ought and what ought not to be done.

·: . , ,·:..Ye_t ln April 1937, the Su.p reme Court .ruled; that the
Schechter

c~se

was unapplicable and upheld the .National -L aoor

Raltions;.Act in a series of five separate cases..

·The first

and most important of these ca..ses was Na.tiGnal .L abor Relations
Board Y..!.. Jones and Laughlin

St~el

Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 1937.

Here the Supreme Court gave .:tne ·interstate commerce clause
its· maximum sweep.

The Jones and Laughlin case is tne great

modern case on the scope of federal power over interst.a.te
commerce.

Other cases involving smaller . businesses were decided

the same day with the same results.
the Jones

~nd

The panoramic view of

Laughlin case comes into view;

the Uni.ted States

consists no longer of f~rty-eight separate economic enti tie.s .
Economically 'We are one nation, and acco-~dingly, in economic
matters ' we stand . or fall together. 2 6 ·uThe Great Depression
taught us this, and th~ Court of Nin~ Old Men confirmed it. u 27'
Two facts must. be noted about the Wagner Act cases:
(1) the cases were decided by the same nirie justices who had

17.
'invalidated the key 'New Deal. mea.sur,e s.

This was made possible

when Justice Roberts abandoned the conservatives and voted
with the liberal group.

{2). The decisions came at a time

when Roosevelt's court-packing threat was being hotly debated.
The .P resident 1 .s proposed court ref ore now seemed unnecessary.
Since 1937, th_e federal commerce clause has continued
to expand.
the

It . may well be that today the interpretation of

commerce clause by the Supreme
a:s the economic needs of the nation. 28
fed~ral

Court is as broad

·This paper attempts to show the Supreme Court as the
arbiter of' the economic aff'a irs of this nation since the time
of ·our Constitution in 1787.
preting the powers

~f

The Court's decisions inter-

-C ongress under the commerce clause have

· varied through the years depending on the attitudes of the
justices at .the time.

The·r e have been periods when the Court

would be restrictive, but the majority of the justices., over
the .years, favored a · very broad interpretation of the commerce
clause.

The need .for this broad interpretation became in-

creasingly evident as ..the

· unite~

States shifted from an

agra,r ia.n to an industrial, urban society.

The "Nine Old Men"

lived up to the demands of our .c hanging, modern :s ociety by
gearing-

t!leir interpretation of the federal commerce clause

to the needs of ·the day.
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